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Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRETMEMORANDUM

April 21, 1988

TO: INF IG

FROM: Jenonne Walker, Chairman, INF WG

SUBJECT: WG Discussion April 20 of Issues remanded to it by April 19 IG

The Working Group has agreed on the following positions on the issues the April 19 IG asked it to address:

1. Smallest inspectable item. The Treaty is clear that at Magna Soviet inspectors can look for items as small as Pershing II first stages, and that at Votkinsk, U.S. inspectors can look for fully-assembled SS-20 missiles outside their canisters and without front sections. During other types of inspection, however, both sides can look for stages of missiles as listed in the MOU. In fact, they can look for items as small as missiles, stages, launchers and support equipment as listed in the MOU.
2. Dual-hatting of inspectors. Nothing in the Treaty prohibits a side from listing a single individual as both a portal monitor as well as an inspector. Nor does the Treaty prohibit use of, for instance, Magna monitors for elimination inspections. Inasmuch as this possibility was not foreseen, however, OSD and JCS want to make sure we have thought this through carefully. Therefore, OSIA will ask the Soviets on April 21 under what circumstances they might want to "dual-hat" inspectors, and how they could ensure that all timelines and all other Treaty procedures could be met under such circumstances. OSIA would promise only that the U.S. would consider such an approach.
3. German P-IAs at inspectable INF sites in the U.S. We will not raise this matter with the Soviets now, either in the technical talks or in diplomatic channels. The Soviets were told in the Geneva negotiations that their inspectors might see some West German P-IAs at some U.S. INF sites. Upon arrival of Soviet inspectors at a site that has West German P-IAs in an inspectable area, the U.S. escort, after handing over the written list of TLIs on site and the diagram of their locations, will note orally that Soviet inspectors might also see some West German P-IAs -- as had been foreseen during the negotiations. Ambassador Holmes will be asked to tell FRG SCG rep Josef Holick of this plan on the margins of the April 25 SCG. (Normally, the FRG P-IAs are kept out of inspectable areas, but maintenance work, for example, can only be done within inspectable areas.)

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4. Recording technical agreements. ACDA and State lawyers believe various methods would be legally acceptable and that the issue is primarily one of policy. WG members favor having General LeJoie and General Medvedev initial the agreed summaries of each of the technical discussions, after Entry into Force, as the best way to get signed Soviet commitment to the agreements without seeming to have reopened formal negotiations on the Treaty. This procedure is ad ref to OSD's lawyer.

5. Getting Soviet response to issues raised by Embassy Moscow. General LeJoie will tell Medvedev that, following Medvedev's statement last week (that his delegation was prepared to discuss the matter but that he was not a diplomatic channel), our Embassy in Moscow took it up with the MFA. The MFA official said that the Soviet response could be obtained from Kortunov, who is in Washington for the technical talks. General LaJoie will therefore suggest to Medvedev that, since that latter has said he is not a "diplomatic channel," he should ask Kortunov to meet with Ambassador Glitman at the State Department to convey Moscow's response. If that does not work, Secretary Shultz will be asked to express our impatience for answers during his current talks in the USSR.

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